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n order to analyze and percept, even partially, what is the manifestation 
of complexity of contemporary intelligence operations and their realizati-
ons, the authors primarily points at actual understanding of intelligence opera-
tion concept. They indicate intelligence operations elements and signifies that 
enormous resources and financial means are spending during realization. Al-
so, points that is necessary to manage complex processes of intelligence ope-
rations realization, in order to enable their efficiency and efficient ending of 
whole intelligence enterprise. Realization of diverse intelligence enterprises, 
for its complexity, dynamism and uncertainty, perforce need intelligence met-
hodical project analysis of organizing, conducting and managing intelligence 
operations. Survey of intelligence operations management is, irrespective of 
level of ambition and detailing, extremely difficult attempt. In this paper phases 
of intelligence operations development are given and it points that intelligence 
operations planning represent first phase in process of operations manage-
ment, which contains definition of aims, directions and global development 
strategy, specification of measures and means for achievement of established 
goals and selection of best alternative.  
 
Кључне речи: national security, intelligence activity, intelligence and 
security agencies, intelligence operation, management operation. 
 
Instead of Introduction: 
The Concept of Intelligence Operations 
n order to analyze and a deeper look at, at least in part, what is reflected in the 
complexity of modern intelligence operations and their implementation, one should 
first define what is now understood as the term of the intelligence operation. In everyday 
                              
1 Assistant professor Dragan Manojlović, Ph. D, cid.serbia@yahoo.com; Associate professor Saša Mijalković, 
Ph. D, sasa.mijalkovic@kpa.edu.rs; Associate professor Božidar Banović, Ph. D, bozidar.banovic@mod.gov.rs. 
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work of intelligence and in social life, the term operation is in a very wide use. An intelli-
gence operation2 is usually defined as a complex and unique project which is undertaken 
in the future to achieve goals in provided time and given resources. The complexity of 
intelligence operations is expressed through a large volume and broad structure of inter-
nal projects, a long duration, a huge budget, a large number of participants in the imple-
mentation and other parameters (see: Charles, 2004; Ameringer, 1990). 
The realization of intelligence activities and operations is charged with an extreme 
complexity and uncertainty, which are caused, firstly, by great and increasing complexity 
of the intelligence operations and the environment in which they work, and by extremely 
fast-paced development of science, technology and civilization as a whole. This comple-
xity usually leads to serious problems in the implementation of the intelligence project, 
which is seen in the large and increasing total cost of the realization and the ineffective-
ness of the realization in general (Aldrich, 2000). This means that the basic objectives of 
the realization of each implementation cannot be achieved, namely, the realization in the 
shortest possible time and with minimal participation of material or human resources 
cannot be achieved.3 
Each intelligence project usually consists of a large number of operations, and opera-
tions consist of a large number of tasks, phases, sub phases and individual activities, 
which elements make the complex structure of the intelligence project. „Big“ intelligence 
ventures with several operations, run by the extent and structure, have a very large 
number of stages and activities, and usually last long (ed. Rodney, 2006). The connecti-
ons between phases and activities that make the operation, are numerous and come 
from a complex structure of the operation and of the use of the resources (George, 
1983). A large number of individual stages of intelligence activities, but also a number of 
connections and relations between them and, between them and the environ-
ment/security milieu in which they are carried out, contribute to the complexity of the pro-
cess of the realization of an intelligence operation (Manojlović, Jović, 2004; Berkowitz, 
Goodman, 2000). 
                              
2 Intelligence operation − the operation of gathering information about an enemy intelligence activity; 
intelligence undercover work, spying − the act of keeping a secret watch for intelligence purposes; information 
gathering − the act of collecting information; current intelligence − intelligence of all types and forms of immedi-
ate interest, usually disseminated without delays for evaluation or interpretation combat intelligence; tactical 
intelligence − intelligence that is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations; strategic intelli-
gence − intelligence that is required for forming policy and military plans at national and international levels; 
covert operation − the collection of intelligence openly without concealment reconnaissance; reconnaissance 
mission − the act of reconnoitring (especially to gain information about an enemy or potential enemy); 
counterintelligence − intelligence activities concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security 
posed by hostile intelligence organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage or sabotage or subversion 
or terrorism (see: www.usmilitary.about.com; www.thefreedctionary.com; Mijalković, Milošević, 2010). 
3 For example, Political Action while the Committee of Secret Correspondence was meeting secretly in Phila-
delphia with agents of France, Arthur Lee was meeting in London with Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarcha-
is, the successful author of The Barber of Seville (and later The Marriage of Figaro)-who was a French agent. 
Lee s inflated reports of patriot strength, which either he fabricated for Beaumarchais  benefit or were provi-
ded by Lee's regular correspondent, Sam Adams, won the Frenchman to the American cause. Beaumarchais 
repeatedly urged the French Court to give immediate assistance to the Americans, and on February 29, 1776 
addressed a memorial to Louis XVI quoting Lee's offer of a secret long-term treaty of commerce in exchange 
for secret aid to the war of independence. 
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A large number of operations, the participants in the implementation, either direct or 
logistic, particullary contribute to the great complexity of the implementation of intelligen-
ce efforts, in addition to a number of stages and activities and their linkages.4 Some of 
them are able to quickly and efficiently perform their jobs, to work together with other 
participants and to adapt to different conditions, while others are able to quickly and 
effectively work only in special conditions and circumstances (Stephenson, W. S. (ed) 
(1999). Because, surely, there are significant differences between a large number of 
participants in the realization of the operation, it must lead to major problems when trying 
to arrange all necessary activities in an organized flow of information and coordinate all 
intelligence work to a faster and more efficient place of intelligence operations (Manojlo-
vić, 2005a). Agencies that participate in the realization of intelligence operations enter 
the operation with a large number of employees of different profiles, expertise, knowled-
ge and experience, where each individual performs only a small part belonging to the 
overall implementation of the operation. It is necessary to coordinate the performance of 
individual intelligence activities and to synchronize to the total realization of an efficient 
place that points to the need for coordination and organization of individuals, groups and 
teams, and synchronization of all participants in the implementation of the operation (Ru-
sbridger, 1991). In addition to all the above mentioned elements, the complexity of a lar-
ge intelligence operation contributes to the fact that in the implementation, huge amounts 
of resources and large financial resources are being spent (Johnson, 1993). Since the 
available funds for the implementation are, most commonly, limited, it is necessary con-
sider a rational spending in order to achieve satisfactory efficiency of the overall realiza-
tion of the observed operations, and one of the main objectives of each operation is to 
carry out the realization by minimum possible resources. In addition to resources is an 
important factor that contributes to the complexity at the same time, and that is the time 
of implementation of each activity, task and intelligence operation in general (Winks, 
1996; Manojlović, 2005b). A large number of intelligence activities of which all intelligen-
ce operations consist of, except „small and simple“ operations, usually require a signifi-
cant time of performance, so it is very important for each of the intelligence operation to 
be carried out as scheduled, or in the least possible amount of time. 
It is clear, that the time of the realization of any intelligence operation extends to the 
near and further future, which is in principle uncertain and unknown, and in this way, an 
uceirtanity additional complexity of his methodical consideration is implemented in the 
realization. All this clearly shows how the complexity, uncertainty and the problems bro-
ught by the implementation of intelligence operations, and why it cannot be carried out 
spontaneously and unorganized in an efficient way. The effective realization of intelligen-
ce operations is only possible if it is performed using methodological techniques organi-
                              
4 For example, оn September 26, 1776, the Continental Congress elected three commissioners to the Court of 
France, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and Silas Deane, resolving that „secrecy shall be observed until 
further Order of Congress; and that until permission be obtained from Congress to disclose the particulars of this 
business, no member be permitted to say anything more upon this subject, than that Congress have taken such 
steps as they judged necessary for the purpose of obtaining foreign alliance.“ Because of his wife's illness, Jeffer-
son could not serve, and Arthur Lee was appointed in his stead. With Franklin's arrival in France on November 29, 
1776-the first anniversary of the founding of the Committee of Secret Correspondence-the vital French mission 
became an intelligence and propaganda center for Europe (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_Intelligence_Operations). 
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zed in a way, by wich one can perform a detailed insight, plan all the individual proces-
ses, and coordinate and direct the individual activities and the implementation as a who-
le. Only in this way the intelligence operation will be protected from enemies counterintel-
ligence.5 
The Complexity of Intelligence Operations 
It is obvious that it is necessary to manage the complex process of implementation of 
an intelligence operation, to effectively carry out and ensure the effective completion of the 
entire intelligence enterprise. The realization of various intelligence projects, due to their 
complexity, uncertainty and liveliness, requires a methodological elaborate of the organiza-
tion, leadership and management of the intelligence.6 Therefore, now in the intelligence 
                              
5 Probably the first Patriot organization created for counterintelligence purposes was the Committee (later called 
the Commission) for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies. It was made up of a series of groups established in 
New York between June 1776 and January 1778 to collect intelligence, apprehend British spies and couriers, and 
examine suspected British sympathizers. In effect, there was created a „secret service“ for New York which had 
the power to arrest, to convict, to grant bail or parole, and to jail or to deport. A company of militia was placed 
under its command to implement its broad charter. The Committee heard over 500 cases involving disloyalty and 
subversion. John Jay has been called the first chief of American counterintelligence because of his role in directing 
this Committee's work. Nathanial Sackett and Colonel William Duer were particularly successful in ferreting out 
British agents, but found their greatest success in the missions of one of the dozen or so agents of their own, 
Enoch Crosby. Crosby, a veteran of the Continental Army, had been mistaken by a Westchester County Tory as 
being someone who shared his views. He confided to Crosby that a secret Tory military company was being for-
med and introduced him to the group. Crosby reported the plot to the Committee and was „captured“ with the 
group. He managed to „escape“ and, at Committee direction, infiltrated another secret Tory unit. This unit, inclu-
ding Crosby, was also taken and he „escaped“ once more. He repeated the operation at least two more times, 
before Tory suspicions made it necessary for him to retire from counterintelligence work. Crosby was the model for 
the central character in James Fenimore Cooper's book The Spy (1821) − the first espionage novel written in 
English (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_Intelligence_Operation). 
6 For example, Covert Action In July 1775, Benjamin Franklin and Robert Morris worked out a plan in collabora-
tion with Colonel Henry Tucker, the head of a distinguished Bermuda family, to obtain the store of gunpowder in 
the Royal Arsenal at Bermuda. To give Bermuda much-needed foodstuffs in exchange for the powder, the Conti-
nental Congress resolved on July 15, 1775 to permit the exchange of food for guns and gunpowder brought by any 
vessel to an American port. On the night of August 14, 1775, two Patriot ships kept a rendezvous with Colonel 
Tucker's men off the coast of Bermuda, and sent a raiding party ashore. An American sailor was lowered into the 
arsenal through an opening in the roof, and the doors opened from the inside. The barrels of gunpowder were 
rolled to waiting Bermudian whaleboats and transported to the American ships. Twelve days later half of the pow-
der was delivered to Philadelphia and half to American forces at Charleston. America's second covert action effort 
ended in failure. General George Washington, hearing independently of the Bermuda powder, dispatched ships to 
purchase or seize it. Lacking a centralized intelligence authority, he was unaware of the Franklin-Morris success; 
when Washington's ships arrived in Bermuda in October 1775, the gunpowder had been gone for two months and 
British ships patrolled Bermuda waters. On the basis of information received by the Committee of Secret Corre-
spondence, the Continental Congress on February 15, 1776 authorized a covert action plan to urge the Canadians 
to become a „sister colony“ in the struggle against the British. A French printer was dispatched to Canada „to esta-
blish a free press... for the frequent publication of such pieces as may be of service to the cause of the United 
Colonies.“ Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll were appointed from the Congress to undertake 
the mission, and Father John Carroll was invited to join the team to prevail upon the Catholic clergy of Canada. 
The delegation was given a degree of authority over American expeditionary forces in Canada; it was empowered 
to raise six companies in Canada, and to offer sanctuary in the thirteen colonies, in the event its effort failed, „for all 
those who have adhered to us.“ (en.wikipedia.org). 
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methodology, numerous techniques of planning, organizing and management have deve-
loped, which are used for management operations. As the best method (concept) for the 
effective management venture, a concept of five levels, such as: philosophical, strategic, 
tactical, logistical and managemental, is being used today. This concept has developed in 
the not so distant past with the implementation of „major“ intelligence projects and operati-
ons within the enterprise. Today, this approach is successfully used for the management of 
intelligence research and other operations, as an excellent method to achieve the planned 
objectives, and that is the realization of the intelligence efforts of this performance in sche-
duled time and with the planned resources (human and material). 
Philosophical, strategic, tactical and managerial approach to management is a science-
based and practical concept, by which, with the help of appropriate methods of organizing, 
planning, management and control, a rational adjustment of all necessary resources and 
coordination of required activities is carried out to realize an operation within the enterprise, 
or to realize the enterprise alone in the most effective manner (Manojlović, 2005a). 
The main objective of managing the implementation of the intelligence project is to pro-
vide the required technical performance and quality with the least time and risk/risk of reali-
zation. If it is not possible to achieve the planned time and eliminate the risks, it is intended 
to decrease the duration and the risk to the minimum, so that their impact is not beyond the 
justification of intelligence operation itself. This kind of approach represents a universal 
mean, a necessary tool of the methodology of intelligence. Every intelligence agency requi-
res a methodological elaboration for each complex intelligence operation or activity, to 
successfully achieve its goal. Modern intelligence organizations require constant methodo-
logical education to act and develop in n the complex and dynamic security environment in 
which they operate. Implementation of the intelligence work is not a phenomenon of today's 
time, but a necessity of modern life and work of intelligence agencies in one hand, the mo-
ment of civilization, evolution and the phenomenon of the security milieu which are increa-
sing, and its total complexity that is growing with the growth of security challenges, risks 
and threats on the other hand, and demands of the community ond the third side. A 
methodology is required for efficient functioning and development of each intelligence 
agency and its activities, each of its individual system and the system as a whole, or effec-
tive development of each complex work and projects within its jurisdiction. A methodologi-
cal approach in solving various problems, is the basic characteristic of modern intelligence 
management, a modern scientific discipline without which an effective action is impossible, 
as well as functioning and development of the agency and its resources.  
Methods of intelligence work, in which the basis of the intelligence work is carried out, is 
becoming increasingly important for the work of secret agents which are specialized and 
more complex, and for intelligence operations, as well. The fast technological development 
outs the need for the use of methodological techniques and approaches, respectively, the 
use of methodology as a scientific and practical discipline that deals with the construction of 
techniques and methods of management of intelligence systems and processes, as well as 
all intelligence activities in the intelligence system, in order to improve their efficiency. 
This (firstly) skill, and surely a separate scientific discipline today, is directed to find 
such methods and techniques to improve the implementation of various activities and 
projects and makes the functioning and development of intelligence systems more effec-
tive. Furthermore, the methodology of intelligence work is a scientific discipline with a 
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multidisciplinary character which explores the problem of, we would say, the manage-
ment of very specific businesses, endeavors and intelligence systems (Manojlović, Jović, 
2004). This discipline studies the management systems as a complex process with a 
series of intelligence tasks and activities. Also, it studies all problems and phenomena 
related to the efficient execution of certain tasks and tasks of intelligence operations. 
Individual, specialized disciplines, such as the development of education and intelligence 
regrutes and systems, are focused on on the management of individual processes, en-
deavors or functions in order to achieve a better performance. 
The methodology of intelligence work has a fundamental meaning for global and par-
tial research of functioning and development of the intelligence systems, subprocesses, 
and individual projects that are realized within the intelligence operations. To explain the 
term of management of intelligence operations more closely in the most general sense, 
let us begin with the consideration of the term itself. First, in general, under the manage-
ment of intelligence work stands an effect of continuous actions that influence the para-
meters of the intelligence work (Manojlović, 2005b), where methods and methodological 
techniques of intelligence work exist, which convert the intelligence operations from one 
state to another. The management of intelligence work is associated to the accomplis-
hment of goals of the intelligence system, ant therefore it is defined as a continuous pro-
cess that is oriented towards the realization of goals. Namely, we can say the following, 
the methodology of the intelligence process (a set of actions) is a process that acts on 
the intelligence system and the system resources, for that it/they could reach the defined 
intelligence goals. Basically, the goals of the methodology of intelligence work represent 
the future state which the system tends to achieve. In order to achieve the set intelligen-
ce goals, ie. to define a realized intelligence goal, the methodology directs the operation 
of all intelligence resources to intelligence goals. In terms of the previous general indica-
tions, the methodology of intelligence work is a process of continuous effects of techni-
ques and methods of translation in terms of intelligence operations from the initial phase 
in the new, desired state. Recent approaches in the theory about the so-called methodi-
cal conduct of strategic intelligence work, which is the continuous process of constant 
adaptation to the intelligence work to the variant environment, in which the environment 
influences the goals of intelligence and its operations, and on the other hand, the intelli-
gence systems alone influence the environment in which it exists. 
A methodological approach to the strategic level includes three segments: establis-
hing and defining goals and strategies of intelligence work, and then the implementation 
of defined strategies and implementation of control. On the other hand, individual intelli-
gence processes are comprised of diverse and complex intelligence activities and acti-
ons, which affect the parameters of continuous intelligence and direct action in a number 
of factors which influence the functioning and development of intelligence operations. 
Considerations of the intelligence process with the methodical aspects include the amo-
unt of activities that are aimed at improvement of the efficiency of the intelligence organi-
zations, and the operations themselves. 
Methodological work includes a large number of activities and actions that are 
continuously carried out in all areas of intelligence work, in order to ensure more efficient 
operation. To summarize, an intelligence operation is a complex process that carries the 
characteristics of the intelligence and social system in which it exists. 
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Management of Intelligence Operations 
The research of the management of intelligence operations is, without regard to the le-
vel of ambition and details, very difficult to undertake. It is more difficult in wartime, than in 
peace.7 Therefore, the realization of the larger ambition of long-term engagement requires 
a larger number of specialists of different profiles and experience, studies of the functioning 
and development of at least dozens of operations, and yet with uncertain end-result (see: 
Mijalković, 2007). Availability of research results obtained in different countries are quite 
limited because the essence of the organization and conduct of intelligence or of a particu-
lar social system and level of economic development and any other development. 
Regardless of the similarity in the problem-solving, the management of an intelligence 
system or an agency is substantially different from the management of intelligence operati-
ons within the enterprise or the individual operations and procedures within the operation. 
The specified complexity in the study leads to the idea that a complete separation of ma-
nagement endeavors of the individual operations has its justification, because it enables to 
further join the study of this very serious and important part of the intelligence enterprise. 
Investigation of each operation, not neglecting their mutual relations within the project 
study, certainly contributes to the improvement of intelligence operations as a whole. 
To approach a more detailed process of management of intelligence operations, it is 
necessary to divide this process into basic parts, and to basic subprocesses, phases, tasks 
or functions as in the literature often called, which in this paper shall not include because of 
its scope and purpose. Firstly, the operations management is a process immanent to any 
intelligence enterprise. Functioning and development of intelligence operations is impossi-
ble without management. On the other hand, intelligence work is a dynamic and continuous 
process, allowing the development and implementation of intelligence operations. 
Development of intelligence operations is a complex process that includes a large 
number of connected practical intelligence activities.8 The present study has a 
                              
7 After Benedict Arnold turned traitor, several special operations, none successful, were mounted in an effort to 
capture him. In September 1780, Major Henry „Light-Horse Harry“ Lee presented to General Washington a secret 
plan to return the defector to American control and bring him to the gallows. Washington approved the plan, but 
insisted that Arnold not be killed or injured in carrying it out, even at the risk of allowing him to escape. „Public 
punishment,“ said Washington, „is the sole object in view.“ Lee's sergeant major, John Champe of Loudoun 
County, Virginia, was assigned to this special mission, and on the evening of October 19, 1780, „deserted“ to the 
British under a hail of gunfire. The official documents he carried and his cooperative attitude during interrogation 
convinced the British of his bonafides. He was appointed sergeant major of Benedict Arnold's so-called American 
Legion, which was made up of deserters and Tories. Champe, now wearing a British uniform and having obtained 
freedom of movement in British-occupied New York, made contact with Patriot agents there and laid plans for 
Arnold's capture. Arnold's legion embarked for Virginia on the night the operation was to take place, and the plan 
was aborted. Champe accomplished his other mission, however: finding out if other American officers were colla-
borating with the enemy. He found no evidence that any were. In March 1781, an attempt to capture Arnold during 
his daily ride to the Virginia shore of the Chesapeake Bay was foiled by the chance anchoring of some British ships 
in the area. Yet another plan, devised by Thomas Jefferson, called for General John Peter Muhlenberg to send 
hand-picked soldiers „to seize and bring off this greatest of traitors“ at Portsmouth, Virginia. Unusual security pre-
cautions at the British outpost thwarted the attempt (www.timesonline.co.uk). 
8 For example, recognizing the value of an important hostage, General Washington in 1782 approved a plan to capture 
the son of King George III, Prince William Henry (the future William IV), during the young naval officer's royal visit to New 
York. The operation failed to come off after British intelligence heard about it and the Prince increased security around 
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systematic approach, which viewes the operation as a complex system with a large 
number of tasks and relations between them and between them and the environment. 
Management operations should be comprehensive and should include all functions wit-
hin the operation, and the entire process. 
In order to solve management problems in intelligence operations, scientific methods 
are applied, we can say almost of almost all sciences. Today, it is not possible to do this 
without computers and the information-based systems, etc. Secondly, management and 
control, intelligence operations, has been founded many centuries ago, but it gets it sci-
entific meaning in the modern scientific age (Prados, 1995). It includes several activities 
such as: 1) assessment of possible future conditions and the definition of future actions 
(means in the modern sense, includes the prediction and planning), 2) security operati-
onsof all resources that are necessary for effective functioning, 3) coordination of all acti-
vities and factors in order to maintain efficient and effective functioning, 4) monitoring 
and checking whether all the activities within the operations are in accordance with the 
orders, 5) giving certain orders; 6) selection of the best action between several available 
alternatives, in order to achieve the desired goal; 7) determination structure and distribu-
tion of the individual work within the operations and activities; 8) selection and training 
resources; 9) measurement of current performance and to maintaining a certain goal; 
10) transfer of authority to the other for the purpose of achieving the desired goal; 
11) prediction of future operations. All activities are closely linked in a unique process 
and can be aggregated and considered individually; 12) guidance to all participants 
adopted. What enables us to access scientific management operations: 1) to undertake 
                              
himself. After William later became monarch, the American ambassador told him of the wartime plan and of Washington's 
edict that, if the mission were successful, the young Prince should suffer no „insult or indignity.“ Upon hearing the story, 
William IV responded: „I am obliged to General Washington for his humanity, but I'm damned glad I did not give him an 
opportunity of exercising it towards me.“ On the high seas, British supply ships and troop ships often fell to American priva-
teers operating under letters of marque and reprisal from the Continental Congress. Franklin, for example, ran a flotilla of 
Irish and French privateers from the American mission in Paris. Success in intercepting British vessels was so great that 
the British accused their captains of taking bribes from the Americans to surrender their ships. One privateer, operating 
under contract to Silas Deane and a French business associate and utilizing a French ship obtained by Benjamin Franklin, 
was the Bonhomme Richard, commanded by John Paul Jones. Of the sabotage operations conducted by the American 
patriots, only one mission is known to have been launched in England. Sometime after his arrival in Paris, Silas Deane 
was visited by young James Aitken, recently returned from America. Aitken produced crudely drawn but accurate plans of 
Royal dockyards in England and proposed to sabotage them by utilizing a unique incendiary device of his own design. 
Deane engaged his services and issued Aitken a passport signed by French Foreign Minister Vergennes with instructions 
to French officials: „We will and command you very expressly to let pass safely and freely, Mr. James Actzen, going to 
England, without giving him or suffering him any hindrance; but on the contrary giving every aid and assistance that he 
shall want or occasion for.“ In late November 1776, Aitken landed at Dover, and on December 7, he ignited a fire at the 
Portsmouth dockyard that burned from late in the afternoon until the following morning, destroying twenty tons of hemp, ten 
one-hundred-fathom cables, and six tons of ship cordage. After failing to penetrate the security at Plymouth, Aitken proce-
eded to Bristol, where he destroyed two warehouses and several houses. On January 16, 1777, the British cabinet met in 
emergency session and urged immediate measures to locate the mysterious „John the Painter“ (Aitken was a house 
painter). Guards were augmented at all military facilities and arsenals, and a reward was posted. By January 20 the cabi-
net, again in extraordinary session, discussed suspending habeas corpus and placing the country under martial law. Five 
days later the reward was increased to one thousand pounds and newspapers reported panic throughout England. Aitken 
was soon apprehended, with a pistol and inflammables in his possession. He would not admit to the sabotage when inter-
rogated, but eventually confided in a friendly American visitor-who was secretly in the pay of the British. Based on these 
confidences, personal effects, including the passport from Vergennes, were located, His trial was speedy, and on March 
10, 1777, Aitken went to the gallows at Portsmouth dockyard, where his exploits had begun (www.webroots.org). 
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detailed studies of the entire process of operations, but also to establish new approaches 
to the global process management activities; 2) prediction of future conditions and to 
define future objectives and tasks; 3) determination of the necessary resources to mate-
rial and human; 4) measuring and evaluating the performance and the required audit; 
5) establishing goals and objectives and finding the best ways of their realization; 6) the 
construction of intelligence organizations and agencies that should make the planned 
tasks; 7) checking the achievement of planned tasks in the operation and provision of 
information necessary for making concrete decisions. Apart from these, there are many 
divisions of the intelligence theory when the topic is the process of management of intel-
ligence operations in general, as well as the management of control systems and intelli-
gence agencies (Manojlović, 2005a). 
Because there are no significant differences between them, we shall not mention 
them anymore. In addition to the above stated, we shall say that intelligence operations 
have the three phases: 1) planning, 2) realization, and 3) control. Also, at first glance, it is 
noticeable that the activities are not elaborated according to some kind of sequence, as it 
has been done in the Intelligence theory. This is not done accidentally, because our goal 
is not to learn according to some kind of order, but to learn how to think about it.  
The Development Phases of Intelligence Operations 
The planning of intelligence operations is the primary phase in the process of mana-
gement of an operation which includes: 1) defining the goals, directions and global deve-
lopment strategy, 2) determination of ways and means to achieve the set goals, and 3) 
selection of the best alternative. In order to carry out proper planning, it is necessary to 
previously perform the required research, for example, flash intelligence research, on the 
basis of which we can receive data and information necessary for managing the entire 
process, with which we can enable an efficient development (Aldrich, 2000). The plan-
ning stage is a complex process that includes a number of different intelligence activities. 
Within the planning, a prediction of future conditions and future events is carried out, 
without which we would not be able to formulate goals which could be attainable with the 
operation, and we would not be able to realize the phase of planning and the process of 
execution and development operations as a whole (Shulsky, Schmitt, 2002).9 
                              
9 On November 9, 1775. the Continental Congress adopted its own oath of secrecy, one more stringent than 
the oaths of secrecy it would require of others in sensitive employment: „RESOLVED, That every member of 
this Congress considers himself under the ties of virtue, honour and love of his country, not to divulge, directly 
or indirectly, any matter or thing agitated or debated in Congress, before the same shaft have been determined, 
without the leave of the Congress: nor any matter or thing determined in Congress, which a majority of the 
Congress shall order to be kept secret, And that if any member shall violate this agreement, he shall be expel-
led this Congress, and deemed an enemy to the liberties of America, and liable to be treated as such, and that 
every member signify his consent to this agreement by signing the same.“ On June 12, 1776, the Continental 
Congress adopted the first secrecy agreement for employees of the new government. The required oath read: 
„I do solemnly swear, that I will not directly or indirectly divulge any manner or thing which shall come to my 
knowledge as (clerk, secretary) of the board of War and Ordnance for the United Colonies.... So help me God.“ 
(www.michaelcarloneil.com). 
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The planning phase of operations, with its output and channel of direct connection, is 
connected to the next phase, the phase of realization, while it is related to the realization 
phase and phase control by feedback (George, 1983). The realization phase includes the 
implementation of the concrete execution of the selected alternative and consists of the 
immediate preparations for the implementation and realization of direct realization. Prepa-
ration for the implementation contains elements of preparation and organization of intelli-
gence activities and actions that should be carried out in a direct realization. The entrance 
to the realization phase includes information from planning, which represents a direct link to 
the realization phasesociated direct link, and also information from the environment. The 
exit from the operation is associated with the phase control by a direct link. The phase of 
realization is connected to the planning phase with a reversible link (Dulles, 1985). 
The control phase is the last phase of the process in the realization of an intelligence 
operation, in which comparisons are being made between the given (planned) and reali-
zed. The control phase receives the outputs from the realization phase, and checks whet-
her these outputs are implemented as planned. Output from control is reversibly connected 
to the planning phase and with the realization phase, and in this way responds to possible 
discrepancies in the realization and it affects the realization by a new planning, for correcti-
onal purposes. The control phase should be understood dynamically, and as the control of 
realization and control of realized (Ameringer, 1990). Control not only compares the final 
exits, but permanently receives information from realization, and controls whether the in-
formational realization process is performed as prescribed. In this sense, the possible 
adjustments that, on the basis of information obtained by feedback connection, the plan-
ning phase carries out, or the phase of realization, timely and greatly improve the final ef-
fects of intelligence operations (Johnson, 1993; Raviv, Melman, 1990). The control recei-
ves and compares the final outputs from the realization phase with the set, and sends the 
information again in the planning phase. On the basis of this information, in the retransmis-
sion of the process, necessary corrections and improvement of process that controls the 
intelligence operation are carried out (Rodney, 2006). 
The process of management of the intelligence operation, either as the overall ma-
nagement of the global venture, or a single process or function-observation, recruiting, 
management of intelligence sources, etc., is a complex process which, as we say, can 
be seen through three main phases − planning, implementation and control. It is a conti-
nuous and constantly recurring process in which the three phases are constantly repea-
ted and alternated, and very often overlap in the continuous process of development of 
operations. So, planning as a global phase of the process of development, realization 
and management operation, also consists of the same process-planning, realization and 
control, so we have: planning of the planning operation, realization of planning operation 
and the control of planning operation. 
Conclusion 
A new approach in theory and professional practice, points to the need for strategic, 
methodical management of intelligence work, which is a continuous process of constant 
adaptation of the intelligence work in an altering environment, in which environment im-
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pacts the intelligence objectives and operations, but the intelligence systems alone im-
pact the environment,as well. The methodological approach to the strategic level has 
three segments: a) establishing and defining goals and strategies of intelligence work, b) 
the implementation of defined strategies, and c) the control of realization. 
Intelligence operations always take place in a context that makes a set of objective 
facts and political circumstances. A set of objective facts represents the conditions and 
the climate in which the operation is carried out. A closer or further end-limit is accom-
plished by the management of intelligence operations, as in, are the set final limits possi-
ble to accomplish, and how to reach them. 
Knowledge, not just practice, but gained much more scientific, is a key resources to 
enrich the quality of intelligence collection activities of learned data and information and 
the requirement for quality intelligence information or studies, the safety of citizens, 
property and state interests. 
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